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Tax policy and yardstick voting   
in Flemish municipal elections   
 
Abstract.   
 
Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters 
compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions.  In these yardstick 
competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with 
policy in neighbouring jurisdictions.  We analyse municipal elections in Flanders 
during the period 1982-2000 and find empirical evidence for yardstick voting.  
Incumbents are punished for higher tax rates.  Importantly, the electoral 
punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities.  Higher 
rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Several theoretical and empirical papers have explored the influence of tax 
policy (or fiscal policy) on elections.  A recent addition to this literature has been 
the concept of yardstick voting.  Besley and Case (1995) present a political 
agency model in which voters compare their tax policy with that in 
neighbouring jurisdictions.  They show how yardstick voting can help voters 
identify bad incumbents.  They find empirical evidence for yardstick voting in 
U.S. state elections in the period 1960-1988.  Revelli (2002a) analyses local 
elections in the UK in the period 1979-1990, but finds no evidence of yardstick 
voting however.  Investigating local elections in more than 3000 municipalities 
in 1995, 1999 and 2003, Bosch en Solé-Ollé (2004) find that property tax increases 
have a negative impact on the incumbent vote share, while property tax 
increases in neighbouring municipalities have a positive effect.  Similarly, Agren 
(2004) finds evidence for yardstick voting in Swedish municipal elections in the 
period 1983-2002.  She finds that voters punish higher income tax rates but that 
this electoral impact also depends on incom  tax rates in neighbouring 
municipalities.   
 
Clearly, there is little empirical research on yardstick voting and evidence 
remains mixed.  The Belgian political context is characterised by highly 
fragmented municipal governments and councils.  We analyse whether the 
evidence for yardstick voting found in two-party contexts (Besley and Case, 
1995) can be generalised to more complex political environments.  Empirical 
work on economic voting has shown that this is not so self-evident.  Powell and 
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2
Whitten (1993) show that economic voting is weaker in those contexts where the 
clarity of responsibility of the government for economic policy is low.  In a 
politically fragmented environment the responsibility for economic policy and 
tax policy is less clear.  It is therefore possible that municipal governments are 
not held accountable for tax policy and as a consequence there is no yardstick 
voting. Our application on Flemish data allows us to examine whether yardstick 
voting also occurs in a politically fragmented environment.  Analysing 
municipal elections in the period 1988-2000, we do find evidence for yardstick 
voting. 
 
In section 2, we briefly review the existing theoretical and empirical literature on 
the electoral cost of taxation and more specifically the literature on yardstick 
competition.  Section 3 gives a brief discussion of the institutional context and 
the role of local taxation in Flanders.  Section 4 gives the results from our 
empirical analysis of Flemish municipal el ctions.  We examine if tax policy has 
an impact on election results and if yardstick voting occurs.  Thereby we 
concentrate on the two major local taxes: the local income tax and the local 
property tax rate.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The electoral cost of taxation: a review of the literature 
 
Following Downs (1957), rational individuals vote instrumentally.   Voters vote 
for the party or politician from which they expect the highest utility gain. Their 
expectations on how parties will perform after the elections are based on party 
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platforms and – for incumbent parties – also on past performance.   A positive 
evaluation of the incumbent’s past performance will translate into electoral 
gains.   This logic underlies the responsibility hypothesis that has been the 
starting point of the empirical literature on vote and popularity functions.  The 
central point of attention in that literature has been the electoral effect of macro-
economic variables.   High economic growth, low inflation and/or 
unemployment have been found to positively affect the incumbents’ election 
results or approval ratings (Mueller, 2003).   In a way, the voter rewards the 
incumbent for making appropriate use of the policy instruments at its disposal.  
Still, these instruments – notably tax and expenditure policies – are not only 
instruments in macro-economic policy.  They, first of all, allow responding to 
the voters’ demand for public goods and redistribution. Further they determine 
how the cost of these goods is distributed over the population.  Today, 
governments in industrialised countries raise considerable amounts of tax 
revenue.  These taxes directly constrain the individual voter’s capacity to spend 
on private goods and services.  As such, it is natural to expect increased taxation 
to lead to electoral losses for the incumbent.   
 
Several authors view elections in a principal-agent framework.1 The electorate 
is seen as the principal, and the incumbent government is the agent.  Pre-
election promises are generally non-enforceable.  But still as the incumbent 
wishes to be re-elected, voters can discipline the incumbent through 
retrospective voting (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).  They either punish or reward 
the incumbent for past performance or they choose the most competent 
 
1 Among others, Ferejohn (1986), Rogoff (1990), Banks and Sundaram (1993), Besley and 
Case (1995), Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Revelli (2002a). 
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government, using the information about past performance of the incumbent.  A 
recent addition to this literature has been the concept of yardstick competition. 
If cost shocks are correlated with cost shocks in neighbouring jurisdictions, tax 
policy in those jurisdictions can yield information on the quality of the 
incumbent government and reduce asymmetric information between voters and 
the incumbent (Besley and Case, 1995; Wrede, 2001; Revelli, 2002; Bordignon, 
Cerniglia and Revelli, 2004).  Accordingly, voters will use tax policy in 
neighbouring jurisdictions as a yardstick to overcome political agency problems, 
analogous to relative performance evaluation and tournaments in the literature 
on incentives in firms. 2
Empirical evidence for an effect of tax variables (and fiscal variables in general) 
on elections has been well established.  Early empirical research on the link 
between taxes and elections or incumbent popularity focuses on U.S. state data.  
Pomper (1968) and Turett (1971), in early papers on the electoral cost of taxation, 
do not find a consistent significant correlation between tax variables and the 
election results of U.S governors.  Later studies do find an impact on 
gubernatorial elections.  Eismeier (1979, 1983), Kone and Winters (1993), Niemi 
et al. (1995) and MacDonald and Sigelman (1999) look at the effects of specific 
tax policy decisions such as tax introductions or increases.  They find a 
significant effect.  An electoral impact is also found in Besley and Case (1995) 
and Lowry et al. (1998). Hansen (1999), however, finds no influence of the rate of 
change in tax revenue on the approval rating of governors.  Peltzman (1992) 
 
2 The idea of relative performance evaluation was introduced by Lazear and Rosen 
(1981), Holmström (1982) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).  Shleifer (1985) introduced 
the concept of yardstick competition.  The benefits of relative performance evaluation in 
decentralized government were first explored by Salmon (1987). 
Page 6 of 44
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
5
finds evidence of an electoral cost of spending growth in presidential, senate 
and governor elections, but less solid evidence for an electoral cost of revenue 
growth.3 Still, in earlier work on U.S. presidential elections, Niskanen (1975, 
1979) shows that an increase in federal tax revenues (or expenditures) has a 
significant negative effect on the vote for the American presidential candidate of 
the incumbent party.   
 
Outside the US, an impact of tax variables on election results has been found in 
the UK (Pissarides, 1980; Gibson and Stewart, 1992; Gibson, 1996 and Revelli 
2002), in Denmark (Paldam and Schneider, 1980), in Sweden (Hibbs and 
Madsen, 1981; Agren, 2004) in Canada (Happy, 1992; and Landon and Ryan, 
1997) and in Spain (Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 2004).4
Several papers look for empirical evidence for yardstick voting.  Besley and 
Case (1995) estimate the probability of defeat of incumbent governors in state 
elections in the period 1977-1988.  They explore the effect of the change in 
income tax liability of joint filers in the 48 contin ntal states.  Importantly, they 
also look at the impact of the average tax change in the neighbouring states.  
They find that a tax change increases the probability of incumbent defeat while 
the neighbours’ tax change reduces chances of incumbent defeat.   
 
Revelli (2002a) investigates the impact of property tax rates on English district 
elections but finds no evidence for yardstick voting.  One sample consists of “by 
 
3 An effect of spending growth on presidential elections is also found by Cuzán and 
Bundrick (1999). 
4 Brender (2003) finds an impact of fiscal performance (debt and debt change) in local 
elections in Israel. 
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thirds” elections in 87 districts in the period 1979-1990.  Another sample consists 
of “all out” elections in 122 elections for the years 1979, 1983 and 1987.  No 
significant impact from the neighbours’ tax rates on the incumbent vote share is 
found.  In the by-thirds elections Revelli finds a significant effect of the local tax 
rates in the district itself.  When he controls for the influence of national politics, 
however, the significance of the effect of the own tax rates disappears.  
 
In a study of around 3000 Spanish municipalities in three local elections (1995, 
1999 and 2003), Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2004) show that voters do take into account 
both property tax changes in the own municipality and property tax changes in 
neighbouring municipalities in municipal elections.  Agren (2004) finds that 
voters evaluate Swedish municipal governments by looking at income tax rates 
in neighbouring municipalities in 276 elections in the period 1983-2002.    
 
If voters take into account policy in neighbouring jurisdictions, policy makers 
are forced to care about policy in neighbouring jurisdictions too and engage in 
yardstick competition (Besley and Case, 1995).  Besley and Case find evidence 
for tax mimicking among American states.  Other evidence for tax mimicking 
includes Ladd (1992) for American counties, Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) for 
Belgian municipalities, Solé-Ollé (2003) for Spanish municipalities,  Bordignon 
et al. (2003) for Italian municipalities and Revelli (2001, 2002b) for English 
districts. 5 Bordignon et al (2004) stress that evidence for tax mimicking is not 
sufficient evidence for yardstick competition.  Mimicking can also be the result 
 
5 Ashworth and Heyndels (1997, 2000) and Heyndels and Ashworth (2003) present 
evidence that in Flemish municipalities politicians’ opinions on whether a tax rate is 
high (or low) or on whether taxes should be increased, depend on prevailing tax rates in 
neighbouring municipalities.   
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of tax competition.  They develop a model in which yardstick competition can, 
under certain conditions, even lead to opposite results from mimicking.  
Crucially, Besley and Case (1995) present evidence that tax changes are only 
sensitive to tax changes in neighbouring states when the governor can run for 
re-election.  As such, they show that the correlation between tax changes in 
neighbouring states is due to yardstick competition and not to another source.  
Similarly, Solé-Ollé (2003) shows that tax mimicking among Spanish 
municipalities is higher when the electoral margin is low.  Finally, Bordignon et 
al. (2003) find spatial interaction in tax setting in Italian municipalities only 
when mayors do not face a term limit and are not backed by a large majority.   
 
3. Elections and tax policy in Flemish municipalities 
 
The Flemish region consists of 308 municipalities.  Municipal government is 
important in Flanders, and more general in Belgium.  Municipal revenues and 
expenditures have a sizable impact on the economy.  Of total Belgian 
government expenditures, 13 % are by local governments.6 Of total government 
investments, 44.5 % are by local governments, which makes them the largest 
public investors in Belgium.  Finally, 7.8 % of all Belgian government taxes are 
raised by local governments (Dexia, 2004). 
 
Flemish municipalities have a parliamentary political system using mandatory 
voting.  Municipal elections take place every 6 years (the most recent election 
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8
year being 2000).  In each of the 308 municipalities councillors are elected using 
a system of proportional representation (“Highest Averages Imperiali”).  
Depending on the size of the municipality, between 7 and 55 councillors are 
elected.  A local government (mayor and aldermen) is formed by the party or by 
a coalition of parties that possesses a majority of the seats.   
 
The system of proportional representation leads to a highly diverse political 
landscape.  In the most recent municipal elections, on average 5.16 parties 
presented themselves to the local voter.  Whereas in some municipalities only 
two parties contested, the highest number of parties in a municipal election was 
as high as 13.  Many of these parties have a local character with no or only a 
modest link to one of the six main “national” parties.  For most of the parties, 
however, such a link was present and made explicit by using the “national” 
party name in the campaign.7
A major responsibility of the Flemish municipal governments is to set taxes.  
Tax revenues account for more than 40 percent of local revenues, the rest 
coming mainly from grants.  Local governments have considerable freedom in 
choosing tax policy.  This has led to a quite unique situation at the local 
government level in Flanders: municipalities use on average about 20 different 
taxes.  Taken together, well over 100 different local taxes are in use.    Still, while 
 
6 This includes the provinces however. 
7 The six “national” parties were: the ecologist Agalev, the Christian democratic CD&V, 
the social democratic SP.a, the liberal democratic VLD, the nationalist VU and the 
extreme-right Vlaams Blok.  For these parties, we put the word national between 
quotation marks, as their political action is limited to only the Flemish Community, i.e. 
the Flemish speaking subset of the Belgian population.  In federal elections, French-
speaking ecologists, Christian democrats, … participate too.  These parties are separate 
entities without formal links with their Flemish speaking sister parties.  At the 
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9
this remarkable diversification is indeed a prominent characteristic of the 
Flemish municipal tax system, revenues are highly concentrated in only two 
taxes. Table 1 shows the most important municipal taxes in terms of revenue.  
The local income tax (LIT) and the local property tax (LPT) generate about 80 
percent of all tax revenues.  Their tax base is defined uniformly for the 308 
Flemish municipalities. To test whether and how tax policy influences election 
results we can therefore focus on the electoral impact of those two tax rates. 8
______________ 
Table 1 
about here 
______________ 
 
Both taxes are single rate surcharges on the federal income tax and the regional 
property tax respectively.   The LIT is calculated as a percentage of the federal 
tax liability.  The average local income tax rate in 2000 was 6.59 %.  This means 
that residents in the average municipality pay 6.59 % times their federal income 
tax bill.  Local income tax rates ranged from 0 tot 8.5 % in 2000.   It should be 
observed that the local income tax was more important in terms of revenues in 
2000 than the property tax.  The average LPT rate was 1073 % in 2000. This 
means that in the average municipality the LPT was 10.73 times the amount of 
the regional property tax on which it was a surcharge.  The regional property 
tax itself corresponds to 2.5 % of the assessed net rental value of the properties.  
 
beginning of the seventies Belgian political families split up in Dutch speaking party 
and a French speaking party.  
8 Note that the local property tax is levied in all 308 municipalities; the local income tax 
is in use in 305 municipalities. 
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So, the average local tax corresponds with (10.73*2.5=) 28.8 % of the net rental 
value.  Given that – for budgetary reasons – no re-assessment took place since 
1979 (when property values were expressed in 1975 prices) the tax base does not 
“really” reflect the net rental values.  Since 1991, property values are adjusted 
for inflation (but not re-assessed).  As a result, the link between the actual 
market (rental) value of properties and the tax weakened.  Just as for the local 
income tax rate, important variation exists for the local property tax rate, which 
ranged from 438 % to 2000 % in 2000. 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
In this part we estimate a vote function.  A vote function relates the votes 
obtained by the incumbent party (parties) - V - to economic, political and 
budgetary variables (Paldam and Schneider, 1980; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; 
Revelli, 2002).  Our vote function is specified as follows: 
 
[ ] [ ]
itiit
n
1j
titjtijit
t1,-t
1-it
t1,-t
it QRSXTwUVTWVV +++++++= 
=
P
[ ]t1,-t
itV is the vote share obtained at the elections in year t in 
municipality i by the party that was in government over the period [t-1, t], 
that is since the previous election.   In the case of 
coalition government the vote share corresponds with the sum of the shares 
of the coalition partners.   As explanatory variable we include [ ]t,1t 1it

V , the 
Page 12 of 44
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
11
vote share obtained in the previous elections (at t-1) by the same parties - those 
in power over the period [t-1, t].9 Tit are tax and expenditure variables in 
municipality i in election year t, while Tjt are the tax and expenditure variables 
in neighbouring municipality j.  Xit is a vector of municipality characteristics 
thought to influence the vote share.  We discuss the dependent variable [ ]t1,-titV in 
section 4.1. and further present our empirical model and the explanatory 
variables in section 4.2.  In section 4.3, we discuss the estimation method.  The 
empirical results follow in section 4.4. 
 
4.1.  Dependent variable 
 
We study the elections of 1988, 1994 and 2000 in 307 of the 308 Flemish 
municipalities.10 Our dependent variable is the percentage of the vote for the 
government parties.11 However the vote percentage of the government parties 
at the elections is not always available.  Sometimes government parties do not 
participate at the elections following their government term. They may split up, 
or merge with another party – sometimes an opposition party – or simply 
disappear. From the data sources available it is not always possible to determine 
which party participating in the election corresponds to a government party.  A 
party may participate in an election with a different name.  However in that 
 
9 Note that this is not a lagged dependent variable.  This is only a lagged dependent 
variable when the previous government remained in power, i.e. 
when [ ] [ ]1t,2t 1it
t,1t
1it



 = VV .
10 The municipality of Herstappe is considered as an outlier and is left out.  The 
municipality, the smallest in Flanders, had only 85 inhabitants and 72 voters in 2000.   
11 The electoral data come from the Elections Database of the Political Science 
Department of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Data on municipal governments come 
from the municipal data collection “Gemeentelijk Zakboekje”(1985, 1994, 1999, 2002). 
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case, it is difficult to determine which party is the “successor” of the original 
party.  Therefore we only consider these cases where government parties 
participate in the elections with the same name. 12 
We introduce the vote of the government party or parties in the preceding 
election as an explanatory variable to control for the influence for past events.  
Again, it is not always possible to calculate the vote percentage at the previous 
elections, because government parties did not always participate at these 
elections in the same form. A government party may be a part of a cartel list or a 
breakaway faction that formed a new party, and it is impossible to know which 
percentage of the vote this party would have received if it had participated in 
the previous elections in its current form.  
 
______________ 
Table 2 
about here 
______________ 
 
The consequence of this is that we do not have an observation for every election 
in every municipality (see Table 2).  Our panel is unbalanced.  Moreover, we 
also dropped these observations where a mayor or alderman (any member of 
the municipal government) was a candidate on a new list or the list of an 
opposition party in the next election.  In those cases it is difficult to determine 
 
12 In this we follow Buelens and Deschouwer (1997). 
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which parties are to be considered as the real government parties and 
accordingly which parties are to be held responsible for tax policy.  As a result 
our dataset includes 689 observations – of the possible 921 observations.13 
Why so much instability?  Why do parties in Flemish municipalities change or 
disappear so often?  A first reason is that many parties are so called “local” 
parties.  These parties are often formed around one or more political 
personalities or issues in a municipality, and as such are not so stable.  An 
example are the “lists of the mayor”, parties created around the current mayor.  
By omitting a connection with a “national” party, they have the advantage of 
attracting voters and candidates of different ideologies and “national” parties.  
Of course, these parties only exist as long as that certain politician is in office or 
in politics.  Another reason is the existence of cartel lists.  The district magnitude 
in Flemish municipalities is not so large.  It pays off to be a large party.  Also, 
the distribution of seats is based on the Imperiali method, which is more 
advantageous to larger parties.  As a consequence, parties benefit from 
presenting themselves to the voters together in a cartel list.  However, cartel lists 
come and go, because of internal conflict. 
 
13 As we include the per capita expenditures in Flemish neighbouring municipalities in 
our regression, we loose an additional observation (the municipality of Voeren has no 
Flemish neighbours.)  This leaves us with 688 observations.  We did not have 
expenditure data for Brussels and Walloon municipalities.   
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4.2. Empirical model 
 
Next, we discuss the explanatory variables.  Xit, the vector of municipality 
characteristics includes two economic variables and one political variable.  The 
literature on economic voting states that governments are held accountable for 
economic developments.  While (macro-) economic policy is – of course – 
mainly a federal and regional responsibility, local governments may have a 
(marginal) influence or may be held accountable by the electorate despite their 
objective inability to interfere.  Therefore we include the real per capita income 
and the unemployment rate in our regression.  We expect income to have a 
positive effect – prosperity translating into electoral support – and 
unemployment to negatively affect the incumbent’s election result.  
 
As political variable we include the number of government parties in the 
regression.  When a government is made up of more parties, the responsibility 
of each party for policy and economic developments is less clear.14 The result is 
that fragmented governments are less held accountable for positive and 
negative developments (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999).  
Given that, on average, they are more punished for negative developments than 
they are rewarded for positive developments, fragmented governments suffer a 
smaller electoral loss (Nicholson et al., 2002).  Also, voters can shift their votes 
between different government parties (Powell and Whitten, 1993).  Accordingly, 
the number of government parties is expected to have a positive effect on the 
vote.   
 
Page 16 of 44
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
15
The vector of tax instruments T includes the rates of the local income tax and the 
local property tax (LIT and LPT).  We use the level of tax rates in the election 
year.  We expect these to have a negative effect on the election result.  The 
theory on yardstick competition suggests that voters use information on tax 
rates in neighbouring municipalities when deciding on their vote.  We follow 
Besley and Case (1995) and Revelli (2002a) in looking at border sharing 
municipalities.  They argue that geographic neighbours are likely to experience 
similar shocks and therefore information on tax variables in those municipalities 
may be a more informative yardstick to voters.  Additionally, information about 
policy in those municipalities may be more easily available to voters.  More 
specifically we create a spatial weight matrix W = { wij , i, j = 1 … 308} where wij 
is one if i and j are border sharing municipalities and is zero otherwise.  The 
spatial weight matrix is then row-standardized (such that the row elements sum 
up to one).  We then pre-multiply the vector of tax rates with the spatial weight 
matrix.  This means we use the unweighted average of LIT and LPT rates in 
border-sharing municipalities as our neighbour variables.15 The level of tax rates 
in neighbouring municipalities is expected to have a positive impact on the 
election results.  Finally, we include the per capita expenditures in the 
municipality.  In as far as expenditures measure the quantity (and/or quality) of 
public output, we would expect a positive effect on the vote, as we already 
control for the cost of output though the tax rates.  Analogously to the tax rates 
 
14 The argument is also true for divided government (Nicholson et al., 2002). 
15 We also include neighbouring municipalities in the Brussels and Walloon region, as 
the context is very similar.  The local income tax and the local property tax are also the 
major local taxes and the tax bases of both taxes are defined on the federal level. 
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we also include the average per capita expenditures in neighbouring 
municipalities.16
Some taxes have been found to be more electorally costly than others.  This 
difference in political cost is generally attributed to the difference in visibility of 
taxes (Kone and Winters, 1993).  Possibly, in the context of Flemish 
municipalities, the income tax and property tax rates could also have a different 
political cost.  Concentrating on the specific characteristics of those taxes, we see 
two reasons why the local income tax is more likely to be underestimated than 
the local property tax and thus have a lower political cost.  At the same time, two 
arguments can be found that suggest the income tax has higher political costs.  
 
First, in contrast to the local income tax, the local property tax is more likely to 
be perceived as a truly local tax.  Both taxes are surcharges.  This means that – in 
practical terms - they are collected together with the federal (regional) tax on 
which they are based.  As a consequence, taxpayers may fail to identify the 
“municipal component”.   The local component of the income tax is only a 
marginal fraction (around 7 %) of the total tax liability.  In contrast, the local 
property tax is much larger than the regional tax on which it is based (the local 
component is about 90 % of the tax liability).  As a result, taxpayers may not 
distinguish between the respective components of the tax and consider “the 
income tax” as a federal tax and “the property tax” as a local one.17 To the 
 
16 As we do not have expenditure data for the Brussels and Walloon region, the average 
per capita expenditures in neighbouring municipalities take only into account Flemish 
neighbours. 
17 However, a study by Heyndels (1989) shows both the local income tax and the local 
property tax are identified as a local tax by around half of the voters.  Voters were asked 
to name the most important taxes in their municipality. Around 61 % of the voters could 
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extent that this is the case, the property tax is expected to have higher electoral 
costs for the incumbent government. 
 
A second crucial difference is the collection process of both taxes. The local 
income tax is collected through a Pay As You Earn-system whereby employers 
withhold taxes.  In the case of the property tax the whole amount is paid when 
the tax notice arrives, which is once a year.  As the explicit payment of the whole 
amount is more visible, the property tax may have a larger political cost. 
 
On the other hand, the local property tax is a tax on (mainly) residential 
property.   For rented properties, it is formally paid by the owner and (partly) 
shifted to the renter.  To the extent that renter illusion occurs, renters may not 
perceive (or underestimate) their tax burden.  As a result, the local property tax 
may have a lower electoral cost among renters.18 
In addition to these perception-related differences between both taxes, it should 
be noted that both differ also in terms of the definition of the tax base.   While 
the income tax is residence based, the property tax is source based.  This opens - 
in the latter case – the possibility for tax exportation, possibly lowering the 
expected political cost associated with the property tax. 
 
A final thing to note is that local elections do not take place in a (political) 
vacuum.  The impact of national or regional politics on local elections is well 
 
name a local tax. Of this group respectively 49.5% and 48.5 % mentioned respectively 
the local property tax and the local income tax as a local tax. 
18 Heyndels and Smolders (1994) analyse the presence of different types of fiscal illusion 
in Flemish municipalities.  They find no evidence for renter illusion. 
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established (Heath et al., 1999; Jérôme and Lewis-Beck, 2000 and Revelli, 2002).  
In extreme situations, local elections can be considered as referenda for national 
politics and, consequently, the local election results may show little relationship 
with local developments and policies.  Such a multi-level dependency may, in 
the Belgian situation, reveal itself by the fact that changes in the popularity of 
national parties translate into changes for the corresponding municipal parties.   
To capture this possibility, we included a set of party-year dummies ( itP ).19 In 
what follows, we will present the results with and without these dummies.   
 
We also include year effects ( t ) and municipality fixed effects ( i	 ).20 We
discuss the municipality effects further in section 4.3. 
 
4.3. Estimation method 
 
The estimation of our model presents several econometric challenges.  First, as 
has been stated in the literature, the tax variables cannot be assumed to be 
exogenous.  The error term in our model could be correlated with the tax rates.  
It has been shown in the literature on politico-economic models, that politicians 
adapt their policies according to their stock of popularity.  For example Frey and 
Schneider (1978) show that the stock in popularity (more specifically the deficit 
in popularity necessary to secure re-election) affects tax policy in the UK. 
 
19 We include party-year dummies for the five “national” parties that participated in 
municipal government.  A dummy is one if a certain party was part of municipal 
government in that election. 
20 These year effects measure the electoral change common to all governments in a 
certain year.  They could for example measure the electoral rise of the extremist party 
Vlaams Blok (which was not present in any of the municipal governments).  
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Schneider and Pommerehne (1980) show this for Australia.  Therefore 
estimation with instrumental variables is in order. 
 
Furthermore, there could be spatial correlation in the error term.  In that case, 
the presence of the neighbours’ tax variables introduces a bias (Revelli, 1999).  
This is the case if the error term follows a first order spatial auto-correlation 
process:  

=

+=
N
1j
itjtijit w . Again estimation with instrumental variables is more 
appropriate.   
 
Besley and Case (1995) instrument the change in tax liability with year 
indicators and changes in the proportions of elderly and young.  The 
neighbours’ tax change is not instrumented.  In a footnote they mention that 
they find no evidence for spatial correlation in the errors.  Revelli (2002a) 
instruments the property tax rate in the district itself and in the neighbouring 
districts with values of the tax rates lagged two periods or more. 
 
We present results both for OLS regressions and 2SLS regressions.  In the 2SLS 
regressions, own tax rates and per capita expenditures are instrumented by the 
proportion of young people and elderly (as in Besley and Case, 1995), the 
average sale price of small and middle sized houses, the area of the municipality 
and finally the number of inhabitants. 21 The same variables were used for the 
neighbouring tax rates and per capita expenditures.  The average sale price of 
 
21 We had only data for house prices for the period 1990-2000.  We therefore used data 
from 1990 for the election in 1988. 
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small and middle-sized houses in the neighbouring municipalities is the average 
sale price in Flemish neighbouring municipalities only.  Several municipalities 
have Brussels or Walloon neighbours and we include them to create our 
neighbours’ tax variables.  However our dataset of house prices did only 
include Flemish municipalities. 
 
We estimate the OLS and 2SLS regressions both with and without municipality 
fixed effects.22 We present F tests for the significance of the fixed effects.  Note 
that, as we have only three time periods, including municipality effects in our 
regression results in a loss of relatively many degrees of freedom.   
 
The inclusion of fixed effects in our regression can lead to bias if the other 
variables are not strictly exogenous.  The presence of a lagged dependent 
variable in a fixed effects regression is therefore problematic as it is certainly not 
strictly exogenous.  Accordingly, there could be an endogeneity problem with 
the previous vote share of the current go ernment parties.  It should be 
observed that the previous vote share of the current incumbent is not a lagged 
dependent variable in the strict sense.  A lagged dependent variable would be 
the previous vote share of the previous incumbent.  This may or may not be the 
same party as the current incumbent.  However, the previous vote share of the 
current incumbent is equal to the lagged dependent variable in case there is no 
turnover of power.  Consequently the variable may still be problematic in a 
fixed effects regression.  
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Revelli (2002a) is confronted with the same problem.  His dependent variable is 
the vote share for the incumbent party and his regression also contains the vote 
for this party in the previous election.  The regression includes district-party 
fixed effects.  Following Arellano and Bond (1991), Revelli therefore takes first 
differences to get rid of the fixed effects.  As the lagged vote variable is now 
correlated with the error term, he then instruments this variable with the 
incumbents’ vote shares lagged two periods or more.  The vote shares lagged 
two periods or more are valid instruments when there is no serial correlation in 
the error term - a test for second order correlation in the error term of the first 
differenced equation is reported.  Equivalently, the tax variables are 
instrumented with values lagged two periods or more. 
 
We think, however, that the Arellano-Bond estimator is not appropriate in our 
case, given the high turnover rate of power, which is typical of a multi-party 
system.23 We therefore present only OLS and 2SLS regressions. 
 
4.4. Results  
 
First we estimate pooled OLS regressions.  Results are shown in Table 3.  We 
show regressions with and without party-year dummies to control for the 
impact of national politics.  The results are broadly similar for the two 
regressions.  A Wald test shows that the party-year dummies are jointly 
 
22 In these 2SLS regressions the area of the municipality and the neighbouring 
municipalities are dropped as instruments, as the first-stage regressions also include 
fixed municipality effects and the area variables are time-invariant. 
23 Moreover, our dataset is composed of only three time periods.  Taking first differences 
would imply that we are left with only two time periods and lose a significant amount 
of observations.  With only two time periods left, we would also not be able to present a 
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significant, implying there is a national effect on municipal elections.  We also 
present more efficient regressions in which insignificant variables were left out 
one by one.24 
The vote percentage in the previous election has as significant positive impact, 
as expected.  Also the number of government parties has the expected 
significant positive effect on the vote for the government parties.  This confirms 
that fragmented governments lose fewer votes.  The reason could be that it is 
less clear which party voters should hold responsible for policy or that vote 
swings between the government parties are possible.   
 
______________ 
Table 3 
about here 
______________ 
 
Of the economic variables the unemployment percentage has no effect on the 
vote.  This is not surprising as most policy instruments to fight unemployment 
are in the hands of the federal and regional government.  Per capita income 
however has a significant negative impact on the vote for the incumbent parties.  
A possible explanation is that at lower levels of per capita income, voters tend to 
stay with or go back to traditional government parties, reminding of the 
 
test for second-order autocorrelation, which is necessary to test the validity of the 
method.   
24 We also leave out insignificant party-year effects.  The Wald test is for the remaing 
party-year effects. 
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“clientele hypothesis” by Rattinger (Rattinger, 1981, 1991).  Separate regressions 
(not shown here) show us that income has indeed a significant positive impact 
on the vote of the Green Party, a party that was in power in only a few 
municipalities.  Per capita income also positively affects the vote of the extreme 
right Vlaams Blok, a protest party that has never been in power.  This suggests 
that less traditional parties fare better at higher levels of income and that 
traditional government parties fare better at lower levels of income.  
 
The main objective of our analysis was to find out if tax policy has an impact on 
election results.  First, we find that per capita expenditures have no impact on 
the election results.  This is not surprising, as what we really would like to 
include in our regression is the quality and/or quantity of public output.  
Measures of this are difficult to find however.  The relation between 
expenditures and the quality of public output is indeed tenuous.  Nannestad 
(2003) for example finds that there is no relationship between municipal 
expenditures spent on schooling and the quality of schooling. 
We do find an electoral impact of the tax rates.  The level of the property tax rate 
has a significant negative influence on the vote for the government parties.  This 
shows that tax policy has indeed an effect on elections: incumbent parties are 
punished for higher tax rates.  The income tax rate has also a negative impact on 
the vote, although not significant.  This could indicate that property taxes have a 
higher electoral cost.  As mentioned earlier, this could be due to the fact that the 
local income tax is less perceived as a local tax.  Also, income taxes are withheld 
by the employer, whereas the collection of the property tax is more explicit.   
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The average local property tax rate in the neighbouring municipalities has a 
significant positive impact on the election result.  Also the neighbours’ income 
tax rate has a positive though insignificant effect.  This proves that voters indeed 
use tax rates in neighbouring municipalities as a yardstick to evaluate tax policy 
in their own municipalities.   
 
In Table 4 we show the results for the OLS regressions including fixed 
municipality effects.  The results are not in line with the previous findings.  Per 
capita income loses its significant effect.  More importantly for our analysis, the 
average property tax rate in the neighbouring municipalities does not have a 
significant effect on the vote anymore.  The property tax rate in the municipality 
itself continues to have a significant negative effect on the vote for the 
incumbent parties.  Note that the municipality fixed effects are not jointly 
significant at 5 % in the first regression.  They are however significant at 10 %.  
In the more efficient regression and in the regressions including party-year 
dummies they are strongly significant. 
 
______________ 
Table 4 
about here 
______________ 
 
Next we show the 2SLS regressions in which tax and expenditure variables were 
instrumented (Table 5).  Again, we first show the regressions without 
municipality fixed effects.  The Sargan tests do not reject our instruments.  The 
previous vote, the number of government parties and the real per capita income 
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have the same significant impact as in the OLS regressions.  In the 2SLS 
regressions, not the property tax rate seems to have a significant electoral impact 
but the local income tax rate.  The income tax rate has a significant negative 
impact on the election results.  The income tax rate in the neighbouring 
municipalities has no significant effect.  However, in a more efficient regression 
in which insignificant variables were left out, the neighbours' income tax rate 
has a significant positive impact on the vote.  This strengthens the evidence that 
voters use tax policy in neighbouring municipalities as a yardstick. 
 
______________ 
Table 5 
about here 
______________ 
 
Surprisingly, the per capita expenditures in neighbouring municipalities have a 
strongly significant negative impact, while there is no significant impact from 
expenditures in the municipality itself.  We do not find a clear reason for this.  
The regressions with party-year dummies show the same results.  Note that this 
time the party-year effects are not jointly significant. 
 
The coefficients of the income tax rate and the neighbours’ income tax rate are 
economically important.  A 1 % higher LIT rate results in a 5.4 % lower vote 
share (in the more efficient regression).  A 1 % higher LIT rate in the 
neighbouring municipalities leads to a 6.8 % higher vote share.  So, incumbents 
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are only punished for a high tax rate if the LIT rate is lower in the neighbouring 
municipalities.  They seem to interpret a higher than average rate as a sign of 
incompetence or of rent seeking and therefore vote for the opposition 
candidates. 
 
Finally, we show the 2SLS regressions including municipality effects (Table 6).  
Only the previous vote, the number of government parties (and the party-year 
dummies) have a significant effect.  The municipality effects are far from 
significant.  We therefore prefer the 2SLS regressions without municipality 
effects.     
 
______________ 
Table 6 
about here 
______________ 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In our empirical analysis of municipal elections in Flanders we find evidence for 
yardstick voting.  More specifically, our 2SLS regressions show that incumbents 
are punished for higher income tax rates.  Importantly, the electoral punishment 
increases with lower rates in neighbouring municipalities and equivalently 
decreases with higher rates in neighbouring municipalities.  We thereby show 
that yardstick voting not only occurs in a two-party system such as the US 
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(Besley and Case, 1995), but also in a more complex multi-party system such as 
Belgium.  The political fragmentation of the councils and the municipal 
governments could be expected to lead to a reduced electoral accountability.  
However, we do find that voters hold incumbents accountable for tax rates that 
are out of line with the average rate in neighbouring municipalities.  Our 
empirical evidence supports the view that under decentralised government 
voters can - through relative performance evaluation - reduce information 
asymmetry with the incumbent politicians and so, as Wrede (2001) puts it, 
“tame the Leviathan”.  By comparing tax rates (and incumbents) with those in 
neighbouring municipalities, voters can identify rent-seeking or incompetent 
incumbents and vote them out of office.  While evidence for yardstick voting is 
relevant in itself, it is also relevant for the literature on tax mimicking.  The 
analysis suggests that tax mimicking among municipalities, such as found in 
Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) among Belgian municipalities, is – at least partly 
– due to yardstick competition and not only tax competition. 
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Table 1: Five most important municipal taxes in terms of revenue in 2000 
Tax Percentage of total tax revenue 
Local Income Tax 45.8 % 
Local Property Tax 36.7 % 
Tax on Motor-vehicles 2.2 % 
Environmental Tax 1.3 % 
Tax on domestic waste  1.1 % 
Source: Administratie Binnenlandse Aangelegenheden, 2002 
 
Table 2: Missing or dropped observations 
Year 1988 1994 2000 
Government party/ies ( itG ) did not participate in 
election t 
49 82 52 
Government party/ies ( itG ) did not participate in 
previous election t-1 
4 - -
Mayor or alderman (of itG ) participated in election 
t as member of new party or opposition party 
22 12 12 
Total 74* 94 64 
* One observation belongs to the first and the second category, which is why the observations in 
1998 do not sum up to 75. 
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Table 3: OLS regressions 
Dependent variable: Vote 
share government parties 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Prior vote government 
parties 
0.783 
(22.34) 
0.789 
(22.68) 
.779 
(22.27) 
0.794 
(23.38) 
Number of government 
parties 
1.997 
(4.37) 
1.838 
(4.18) 
3.322 
(3.65) 
1.610 
(3.17) 
Per capita income -0.942 
(-1.77) 
-0.756 
(-1.61) 
-0.788 
(-1.49) 
-1.065 
(-2.95) 
Unemployment rate -22.240 
(-0.72) 
 -11.402 
(-0.37) 
 
Per capita expenditures .318 
(0.23) 
 0.466 
(0.34) 
 
Per capita expenditures 
neighbours 
-2.615 
(-1.29) 
 -2.647 
(-1.31) 
 
LIT rate -0.473 
(-1.33) 
 -0.279 
(-0.79) 
 
LIT rate neighbours 0.774 
(1.08) 
 0.206 
(0.29) 
 
LPT rate -.004 
(-2.24) 
-0.004 
(-2.66) 
-0.004 
(-2.34) 
-0.004 
(-3.03) 
LPT rate neighbours 0.006 
(2.63) 
0.008 
(3.57) 
0.007 
(2.81) 
0.006 
(3.19) 
1994 year effect -1.335 
(-1.33) 
-1.807 
(-2.06) 
3.620 
(1.93) 
3.776 
(2.95) 
2000 year effect -1.864 
(-1.42) 
-2.320 
(-1.90) 
-0.363 
(-0.19) 
 
Intercept 11.326 
(1.88) 
-9.412 
(2.48) 
9.981 
(1.64) 
9.746 
(2.78) 
Party-year effects   YES YES 
Wald test party-year 
effects: Prob > F 
 0.0001 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.482 0.482 0.504 0.506 
Number of observations 688 688 688 688 
Note: Values between brackets are t-values. 
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Table 4: OLS Regressions with fixed municipality effects 
Dependent variable: Vote 
share government parties 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Prior vote government 
parties 
0.530 
(9.75) 
0.532 
(10.04) 
0.519 
(9.20) 
0.538 
(10.45) 
Number of government 
parties 
7.194 
(7.45) 
7.088 
(7.63) 
7.551 
(4.72) 
6.521 
(6.83) 
Per capita income -1.594 
(-0.86) 
 -1.428 
(-0.78) 
 
Unemployment rate 45.543 
(0.70) 
 44.064 
(0.67) 
 
Per capita expenditures -3.660 
(-0.66) 
 -2.938 
(-0.53) 
 
Per capita expenditures 
neighbours 
8.205 
(1.07) 
 7.742 
(1.02) 
 
LIT rate 0.318 
(0.43) 
 0.671 
(0.91) 
 
LIT rate neighbours 1.425 
(0.88) 
 1.196 
(0.75) 
 
LPT rate -0.008 
(-2.31) 
-0.010 
(-4.54) 
-0.007 
(-2.18) 
-0.006 
(-2.06) 
LPT rate neighbours -0.010 
(-1.31) 
 -0.008 
(-1.03) 
 
1994 year effect 0.774 
(0.31) 
 5.068 
(1.69) 
3.256 
(4.04) 
2000 year effect 2.734 
(0.59) 
 2.863 
(0.60) 
 
Intercept 22.590 
(1.39) 
23.069 
(6.75) 
15.309 
(0.95) 
16.784 
(4.38) 
Municipality effects YES YES YES YES 
F test municipality 
effects: Prob > F 
0.0708 0.0065 0.0478 0.0024 
Party-year effects   YES YES 
Wald test party-year 
effects: Prob > F 
 0.0018 0.0000 
R2 0.260 0.294 0.288 0.342 
Number of observations 688 688 688 688 
Note: Values between brackets are t-values. 
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Table 5: 2SLS Regressions  
Dependent variable: Vote 
share government parties 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Prior vote government 
parties 
0.748 
(14.96) 
0.753 
(17.62) 
0.758 
(15.79) 
0.758 
(18.02) 
Number of government 
parties 
2.757 
(4.10) 
2.641 
(4.67) 
2.285 
(1.66) 
2.132 
(3.61) 
Per capita income -2.367 
(-1.90) 
-1.480 
(-2.88) 
-1.971 
(-1.61) 
-1.625 
(-3.24) 
Unemployment rate -21.468 
(-0.30) 
 8.323 
(0.12) 
 
Per capita expenditures 0.707 
(0.10) 
 -2.008 
(-0.31) 
 
Per capita expenditures 
neighbours 
-17.580 
(-2.57) 
-11.619 
(-2.99) 
-17.774 
(-2.64) 
-12.954 
(-3.36) 
LIT rate -7.705 
(-2.77) 
-5.268 
(-3.37) 
-6.760 
(-2.31) 
-5.373 
(-3.50) 
LIT rate neighbours 6.953 
(1.28) 
8.132 
(3.35) 
4.103 
(0.79) 
6.841 
(2.76) 
LPT rate 0.0004 
(0.03) 
 0.0009 
(0.07) 
 
LPT rate neighbours -0.002 
(-0.10) 
 -0.0003 
(-0.02) 
 
1994 year effect 2.143 
(1.03) 
 6.062 
(2.15) 
 
2000 year effect 4.033 
(1.38) 
 3.551 
(1.12) 
 
Intercept 37.563 
(1.62) 
5.329 
(0.50) 
44.711 
(1.96) 
16.325 
(1.41) 
Party-year effects   YES YES 
Wald test party-year 
effects: Prob > F 
 0.1488 0.0024 
Sargan test of 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
Chi-sq (4) 
1.684 
p-value: 0.79 
Chi-sq (7) 
4.182 
p-value: 0.76 
Chi-sq (4) 
2.891 
p-value: 0.576 
Chi-sq (7) 
2.648 
p-value: 0.92 
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.270 0.212 0.296 
Number of observations 688 688 688 688 
Note: Values between brackets are t-values. 
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Table 6: 2SLS regressions with fixed municipality effects 
Dependent variable: Vote 
share government parties 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Prior vote government 
parties 
0.485 
(5.71) 
0.482 
(4.72) 
Number of government 
parties 
7.975 
(5.29) 
8.824 
(3.07) 
Per capita income 0.608 
(0.17) 
1.221 
(0.37) 
Unemployment rate 7.605 
(0.08) 
-11.633 
(-0.11) 
Per capita expenditures 64.654 
(0.77) 
45.927 
(0.57) 
Per capita expenditures 
neighbours 
-18.298 
(-0.33) 
-13.408 
(-0.26) 
LIT rate 0.586 
(0.14) 
0.905 
(0.25) 
LIT rate neighbours 2.768 
(0.45) 
2.598 
(0.45) 
LPT rate -0.0008 
(-0.03) 
0.0008 
(0.03) 
LPT rate neighbours 0.002 
(0.05) 
0.010 
(0.27) 
1994 year effect -8.806 
(-0.85) 
-3.324 
(-0.39) 
2000 year effect -14.680 
(-0.78) 
-12.748 
(-0.82) 
Intercept -34.675 
(-0.53) 
-43.378 
(-0.74) 
Municipality effects YES YES 
F test municipality 
effects: Prob > F 
0.9717 0.6961 
Party-year effects  YES 
Wald test party-year 
effects: Prob > F 
 0.0111 
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions 
Chi-sq (2) 
1.652 
p-value: 0.44 
Chi-sq (2) 
1.138 
p-value: 0.57 
R2 0.045 0.097 
Number of observations 688 688 
Note: Values between brackets are t-values. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics (sample of 688 observations) 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum
Vote share (in %) 
government parties at 
election t: )G( ititV
54.93 10.18 24.15 87.3 
Vote share (in %) 
current government 
parties at election t-1: 
)G( it1-itV
56.24 8.32 37.25 88.29 
Number of 
government parties 1.63 0.68 1 5 
Per capita income, in 
1000 EUR 5.49 0.96 3.21 8.88 
Unemployment rate 0.03 0.01 0.006 0.08 
Per capita 
expenditures, in 1000 
EUR 
0.67 0.25 0.23 2.18 
Per capita 
expenditures 
neighbours, in 1000 
EUR 
0.69 0.17 0.42 1.82 
LIT rate 6.53 0.89 0 9 
LIT rate neighbours 6.58 0.51 3 8 
LPT rate 959.61 264.79 170 2000 
LPT rate neighbours 975.77 191.66 400 1650 
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Table 8: Data sources 
Variable Name Source 
Vote share government 
parties  
Own calculations 
based on data from 
the Electoral 
Database of the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel 
(Jo Buelens) and 
“Gemeentelijk 
Zakboekje” (1985, 
1994, 1999, 2002) 
Per capita income, in 1000 
EUR 
National Institute of 
Statistics 
Unemployment rate (number 
of unemployed divided by 
population) 
RVA/ONEM, 
National Institute of 
Statistics 
Per capita expenditures Flemish Ministry of Interior Affairs 
Local Income Tax rate Flemish Ministry of Interior Affairs 
Local Property Tax rate  Flemish Ministry of Interior Affairs 
Party-year dummies 
Own calculations 
based on data from 
the Electoral 
Database of the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel 
(Jo Buelens) 
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